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We investigate the role of budget balances, financial development and openness, in the evolution of
global imbalances. Financial development -- or the lack thereof -- has received considerable attention
as a possible contributing factor to the development of persistent and expanding current account imbalances.
Several observers have argued that the depth and sophistication of US capital markets have caused
capital to flow from relatively underdeveloped East Asian financial markets. In this paper, we extend
our previous work by examining the effect of different types and aspects of financial development.
Our cross-country analysis, encompassing a sample of 19 industrialized countries and 70 developing
countries for the period of 1986 through 2005, yields a number of new results. First, we confirm a
role for budget balances in industrial countries when bond markets are incorporated. Second, empirically
both credit to the private sector and stock market capitalization appear to be equally important determinants
of current account behavior. Third, while increases in the size of financial markets induce a decline
in the current account balance in industrial countries, the reverse is more often the case for developing
countries, especially when other measures of financial development are included. However, because
of nonlinearities incorporated into the specifications, this characterization is conditional upon other
factors. Fourth, a greater degree of financial openness is typically associated with a smaller current
account balance in developing countries.
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1.  Introduction 
The implications of persistent and widening global current account imbalances have 
been at the center of policy debates over the last half decade. While the concerns subside each 
year, as a rapid unraveling of the imbalances fails to materialize, the intellectual challenge of 
determining what drives these imbalances remains. To the extent that some policymakers view 
the configuration of imbalances to be undesirable, a salient question remains what policies would 
cause those imbalances shrink. 
These imbalances are large. The U.S. deficit was 6.5% of GDP, while China’s surplus 
was 9.1%, with balances in the next two years projected at 10%. The rest of the Developing 
Asian region is running an average current account surplus of 5.4%.
1  Finally, the sustained 
elevation in oil prices has added oil exporters to the list of surplus countries. Figure 1 highlights 
the lopsided nature of imbalances, with the U.S. deficit primarily financed by East Asia and the 
Middle East.   
As a consequence of the magnitude of their surpluses, China and other Asian emerging 
market countries have often been identified as the main causes of the widening U.S. current 
account deficits. More specifically, these economies’ underdeveloped and closed financial 
markets are alleged to be insufficiently attractive enough to absorb the excess saving in the 
region, resulting in a “saving glut”. Clarida (2005a,b) argues that East Asian, particularly 
Chinese, financial markets are less sophisticated, deep, and open so that Asian excess saving 
inevitably flows into the highly developed U.S. financial market. Bernanke (2005) contends that 
“some of the key reasons for the large U.S. current account deficit are external to the United 
States” and remediable only in the long run. That is, it is the saving glut of the Asian emerging 
                                                 
1 Figures from IMF, World Economic Outlook (April 2007).  
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market countries, driven by rising savings and collapsing investment in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis, that is the direct cause of the U.S. current account deficit. Therefore, the long 
term solution is to encourage developing countries, especially those in the East Asian region, to 
develop financial markets so that the saving rate would fall. Once policies improving institutions 
and legal systems amenable to financial development and liberalizing the markets are 
implemented, “a greater share of global saving can be redirected away from the United States 
and toward the developing nations.”     
Standing in stark contrast to the saving glut thesis is the more parochial view that a fall 
in the U.S. national saving, most notably in the form of its government budget deficit, is the main 
cause of the ongoing current account deficits – the “twin deficit” argument. While the twin 
deficit effect has been empirically investigated in the literature (e.g., Gale and Orszag, 2004), as 
far as we are aware, very little investigation has been made to shed light on the effect of financial 
development on current account balances, with the exception of Chinn and Ito (2007a).
2 In  this 
investigation encompassing a sample of 89 countries over the 1971-2004 period, we found that 
more financial development leads to higher saving for countries with underdevelopment 
institutions and closed financial markets that includes most of East Asian emerging market 
countries.
3  
This paper takes a closer look at the effect of financial development on current account 
balances and the saving-investment determination. Financial development cannot be defined and 
measured simply (see Beck et al., 2001). Chinn and Ito (2007b) used private credit creation (as a 
                                                 
2 Theoretical explanations for this phenomenon now abound.  See Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2006) and 
Mendoza et al. (2006). 
3 Among East Asian countries, most of countries (except for Hong Kong and Singapore) could experience worsening 
current account balances if financial markets develop further, but that effect is achieved, not through a reduction in 
savings rates, but through higher increases in the levels of investment than those of national savings.  
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ratio to GDP) as a shorthand proxy measure for financial development. Clearly this is a 
simplification with implications that should be investigated. Hence, in this paper, we undertake a 
closer look at the effect of different types of financial development – whether banking, equity, 
bond, or insurance market sector – to gain different insights. Additionally, we investigate various 
dimensions of financial development, such as size, degree of activity, and efficiency. Given the 
ongoing asset market booms in China and other emerging market countries in East Asia, size 
measures alone might lead to misleading inferences. 
Other factors are suggested by the current debate. Bernanke argues that the openness of 
financial markets can also affect the direction of cross-border capital flows. Alfaro et al. (2003), 
on the other hand, show that institutional development may explain the Lucas paradox, i.e., why 
capital flows from developing countries with presumably high marginal products of capital to 
developed countries with low ones. In short, financial development might be mediated by 
financial openness and institutional development. Hence, we will examine interaction effects as 
well. 
Our empirical analysis relies upon a dataset composed of 19 industrialized countries and 
70 developing countries for the period of 1986 through 2005. Financial development is assessed 
from various perspectives: different types of financial markets such as banking, equity, and bond 
markets, as well as different aspects of financial development such as the size, activeness, and 
cost performance of the industry. The analysis involves making one key trade-off: in refining the 
measures of financial development, we reduce the set of countries covered, as well as the time 
sample. We believe that the payoff to making this trade-off is on net positive. 
To anticipate our findings, we find the following. First, we confirm a role for budget 
balances in industrial countries when bond markets are incorporated. Second, empirically both  
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credit to the private sector and stock market capitalization appear to be equally important 
determinants of current account behavior. Third, while increases in the size of financial markets 
induce a decline in the current account balance in industrial countries, the reverse is more often 
the case for developing countries, especially when other measures of financial development are 
included. However, because of nonlinearities incorporated into the specifications, this 
characterization is contingent. Fourth, a greater degree of financial openness is typically 
associated with a smaller current account balance in developing countries. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 recaps the debate over financial 
development, openness and institutions, and how those factors are related to the current pattern 
of current account imbalances, and saving and investment flows. Section 3 details the empirical 
methodology and results. Section 4 draws out the policy implications; Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  Financial and Institutional Development and the Global Saving Glut 
 
2.1. Theoretical Perspectives 
We adopt a medium run prospect approach to evaluate current account behavior. 
Specifically, we view the current account as being driven by saving and investment behavior. 
Consequently, factors that affect either of these two flows – such as demographics, trend income 
growth, terms of trade volatility – should in principal affect the current account. The resulting 
empirical approach was implemented in Chinn and Prasad (2003). 
The proposition that financial development or deepening influences saving and 
investment behavior is by now well established. Financial development could enhance both 
saving and investment by raising returns as well as lowering the cost of capital and the risk of  
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investment. The mitigation of information asymmetries, the reduction of information and 
transaction costs, the improvement of corporate governance, and/or facilitation of risk 
management are all potential channels highlighted in the literature.
4  
However, while the effect of financial development on investment is relatively 
unambiguous (i.e., positive), that on saving is not, since higher returns and lower risk of financial 
investment create effects on saving akin to income and substitution effects. The traditional view 
on the effect of financial development on saving (such as Edwards, 1996) suggests a positive 
association between the two variables; further financial deepening could induce more saving 
through more depth and sophistication of the financial system. A contrasting view suggests that 
more developed financial markets lessen the need for precautionary saving, and thereby lower 
the saving rate. This last observation is the basis for the saving glut thesis, leading to Bernanke’s 
(2005) argument for greater financial development and liberalization as a long run remedy to the 
global saving glut.
5  
Financial liberalization takes a central role in Kose et al. (2006). Liberalization can bring 
about more efficient allocation of capital across countries. Another key aspect of financial 
opening is that financial liberalization directly affects international risk sharing. In an idealized 
world with complete financial markets (and only tradable goods), the location of investment 
should be independent of saving, in order to ensure state independent consumption-smoothing 
(Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996). However, as Feldstein and Horioka (1980) originally pointed out, 
                                                 
4 See King and Levine (1993), Rajan and Zingales (1998), and Wurgler (2000). This is the basis for the argument that 
financial development leads to economic growth. Levine (2005) provides an extensive review on the “finance-growth 
link. ” 
5 If one views the effect of financial development on saving as that of asset markets on consumption, the arguments 
about the wealth effect of asset market performance as well as the balance sheet effects can be relevant to our 
discussion. However, our main focus in this paper is to examine the medium-run dynamics of the determinants of 
current account balances and saving and investment. Therefore, we focus on the comparison between the financial 
deepening view and the saving-glut view.  
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investment and saving are highly correlated. Although that correlation has diminished over the 
years, the extent of the correlation remains nontrivial. In this environment, further international 
portfolio diversification afforded by greater financial liberalization could yield potentially large 
benefits.
6  
Most directly related to the issue at hand, financial openness can affect saving and 
investment determination, and hence capital flows across borders. According to the global saving 
glut thesis, financial development coupled with comprehensive financial liberalization policies in 
East Asia would mitigate savings levels, and further allow excess saving to be “recycled” within 
the region, instead of flowing into the U.S. Similarly, Dooley et al. (2005) argue that, in the 
absence of a well-functioning domestic and/or regional financial system, East Asian countries 
essentially lend capital to the United States at low interest rates, in exchange for efficient 
financial intermediation. The capital returns to East Asia in the form of direct investment. 
The efficacy and integrity of legal environment and the level of institutional development 
should also be important determinants for saving and investment decisions. A society’s legal 
foundations and institutions define the context wherein financial transactions and economic 
decisions are made. Levine, et al. (2000) find that the cross-country differences in legal and 
regulatory systems influence the development of financial intermediation.
7 The  literature 
identifies a number of channels by which legal and institutional development can affect 
investment and saving decisions. Whether the legal system clearly establishes law and order, 
minimizes corruption, or whether the administrative branch of the government protects property 
rights efficiently are all important determinants of the incentives to save and invest. Decisions by 
                                                 
6 Tesar (1995) finds that the possible gains from further international risk sharing is minimal for developed countries, 
where financial markets are well-developed and relatively open and whose economies are relatively more 
synchronized with the world economy, while the gains for developing countries are possibly significant.  
7 See also Beck and Levine (2004), Johnson, et al. (2002), and Levine (2005) among others.  
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foreign residents will also be affected.
8 
2.2    Stylized Facts: Financial Development, Openness, and Institutions   
Figure 2 illustrates development of financial markets in terms of the market size, which 
we measure using SIZE, the sum of private credit creation and stock market capitalization (both 
measured as ratios to GDP).
9,10  Throughout the period, most markets, notably the U.S., Western 
European, and Chinese markets (relative to GDP), have steadily grown. The exceptions are 
Japanese and ex-China East Asian financial markets experienced some retrenchment after the  
bursting of the bubble at the end of the 1980s and the financial crisis of 1997-98, respectively. 
After the first half of the 1990s, U.S. financial markets have been the sole winner in terms of the 
market size. The relative sizes of Western European and Japanese markets are both about 58% of 
those of the U.S., and those of East Asian and Chinese markets are about half of the U.S. 
financial markets.
11 
Beck et al. (2001) argue that the size of the financial system alone may not present a 
complete picture of financial development – a large financial market could be a relatively 
sedentary one involving few market activity. Hence, one needs to examine the activeness of 
financial markets, for which we use stock market total value traded (as the ratio to GDP; SMTV). 
Figure 3 compares SMTV across different countries and regions. In this figure also, we can make 
                                                 
8 Chinn and Ito (2006) find that financial openness leads to financial development especially when a country is 
equipped with developed legal systems and institutions. 
9 All the measures of financial development are retrieved from the financial structure dataset created and subsequently 
updated by Beck et al. (2001). 
10 Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2001) measures the overall size of the financial system by summing domestic assets of 
deposit money banks with stock market capitalization (both as ratios of GDP). However, since we want to focus on the 
private sector development of financial markets, that is more in line with financial development in real sense, we use 
private credit creation instead. 
11 Disaggregated pictures of the size of financial markets show that the relative size of financial markets in terms of 
either private credit creation or stock market capitalization individually are consistent with what is shown in Table 2. 
However, ex-China East Asian countries’ and Chinese financial market developments differ from each other. While 
Chinese financial markets are more developed in the banking sector (its relative size to U.S. counterparts is about 
63%), other East Asian countries are, on average, equipped with more developed equity markets (its relative size is 
about 81%).   
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the same generalizations as we did in Figure 2. The biggest difference from the previous figure is 
that the strength of U.S. financial markets is more pronounced when stock market total value is 
used as the measure of financial development; even the second most active financial markets, 
those in East Asia and Pacific, are only less than 40% of U.S. stock market total value (as a ratio 
to GDP).
12  This is clear evidence that U.S. stock markets are far more liquid than those in other 
regions and countries.   
Figure 4 shows that the characterization of U.S. capital markets extends to private bond 
markets.
13  Even the private bond markets of Western European countries and Japan are less than 
half of U.S. counterparts, and only 22% and 9% for ex-China East Asia and China, respectively, 
showing overwhelming strength of U.S. capital markets.   
Public bond market development presents a different picture, as shown in Figure 5. 
While oil exporting countries have had large public bond markets, Japan’s public bond market 
size is also increasing rapidly, reflecting the sustained period of deficit spending in response to 
years of stagnant growth. The U.S. public bond market is still large compared to other regions, 
but not as large as these two regions.
14 
Following Chinn and Ito (2007a), we measure legal and institutional development using 
LEGAL, which is the first principal component of law and order (LAO), corruption (CORRUPT), 
                                                 
12 Stock market turnover (SMTO) can be a measure of market activeness as well. We will use the variable later as a 
measure of market activeness. When SMTO is compared in the same way as other financial development measures, it 
is shown that China’s stock market turnover was impressively high in the 1991-1995 and 1996-2000 periods, more 
than one and a half times as high as the U.S. figures. But this only reflects the fact that Chinese stock markets grew 
from a small market size.  
13 The variables for private and public bond market capitalization (PVBM and PBBM, respectively) are only available 
after 1990 and for industrialized countries and emerging market countries. 
14 In later sections, we use other measures of financial development, those pertaining to the cost performance or 
efficiency of the financial (mainly banking) industry. INVNETINT is an accounting value of bank's net interest revenue 
as a share of its interest-bearing (total earning) assets, inverted. OVERHEAD is an accounting value of a bank's 
overhead costs as a share of its total assets. For more details of data definitions, refer to Data Appendix.  
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and bureaucracy quality (BQ).
15  Figure 7 compares the level of legal and institutional 
development of different regions and countries with the U.S., whose value is normalized as 100. 
As one can expect, Western Europe and Japan have achieved levels of legal and institutional 
development comparable to the U.S. The other regions lag the developed countries; their relative 
levels of legal and institutional development are about 60% at most.   
The degree of financial openness is compared in Figure 8 using the Chinn-Ito capital 
account openness index (KAOPEN). This index is based upon the IMF’s categorical enumeration 
pertaining to cross-border financial transactions reported in Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). Higher values of this index indicate greater 
financial openness.
16 Like  the  LEGAL variable, financial openness is compared relatively to the 
U.S. While East Asian countries slowed down the level of financial openness after the Asian 
crisis, both the Latin American and Middle East/North African regions have been steadily 
opening their financial markets throughout the sample period. One outlier is China. Not only is 
the pace of financial liberalization slow, so too is its level low.   
The above observations lead us to conclude that China and other East Asian developing 
countries have achieved impressive – but uneven – financial development. Especially when it 
comes to the bond market sector, East Asian economies continue to lag, despite initiatives to 
develop these markets. Interestingly, while the extent of legal and institutional development is 
comparable to other developing countries, China’s financial opening significantly lags behind 
others as is evidenced by the U.S. persistent demand to China for further financial opening. 
Below, we will examine the effects of further development in financial markets and legal systems 
                                                 
15 Higher values indicate better conditions. The choice of these variables is motivated by the literature on the finance 
and growth, as well as the wide coverage afforded by their use.  
16 More details about the data are found in Chinn and Ito (2007b).  
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with an eye to drawing out the implications of further opening of financial markets in East Asian 
emerging market countries. 
 
3.  Empirics 
3.1 Specification and Estimation 
We estimate regressions of the general form: 
() ( ) ( )
(1)                                                                                                                                  
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, 3 , 2 , 1 ,
t i t i
t i t i t i t i t i t i
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KAOPEN LEGAL FD y
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where three dependent variables (y), the current account balance, national saving, and investment, 
all expressed as a share of GDP, are regressed on FD, a measure of financial development; 
KAOPEN, a measure of financial openness; LEGAL a measure of legal/institutional 
development; and X, a vector of macroeconomic and policy control variables. For FD, we will 
include a variable pertaining to financial development depending on an analysis of our interest. 
Following Chinn and Prasad (2003), the vector X contains control variables of “usual suspects” 
as the determinants of current account balances, namely, net foreign assets as a ratio to GDP; 
relative income (to the U.S.); its quadratic term; relative dependency ratios on you and old 
population; terms of trade volatility; output growth rates; trade openness (= 
exports+imports/GDP); dummies for oil exporting countries; and time fixed effects. The sample 
for our analysis covers both industrial and developing countries. The underlying database has 
annual data for 19 industrial and 70 developing countries covering the last twenty-year period 
1986-2005. 
For our empirical analysis, we use a panel that contains non-overlapping 5-year averages  
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of the data for each country. This approach mitigates the effect of measurement errors in annual 
data likely to be particularly problematic in data for developing countries. It also allows us to 
focus our interest in medium-term rather than business cycle variations in current account 
balances.
17  All the variables, except for net foreign assets to GDP, are converted into the 
deviations from their GDP-weighted world mean prior to the calculation of five year averages – 
net foreign asset ratios are sampled from the first year of each five-year panel as the initial 
conditions. The use of demeaned series controls for rest-of-world effects. In other words, a 
country’s current account balance is determined by developments at home relative to the 
rest-of-the-world.   
As the above arguments have made it clear, it is important to examine not only the effects 
of each of financial development, financial openness, and legal/institutional development, but 
also the interactions of these variables. Hence, we include in the estimation the interactions 
between financial development and legal variables (PCGDP × LEGAL), those between the 
financial development and financial openness variables (PCGDP × KAOPEN), and those 
between legal development and financial openness (LEGAL × KAOPEN). The financial and legal 
interaction effect is motivated by the conjecture that deepening financial markets might lead to 
higher saving rates, but the effect might be magnified under conditions of better developed legal 
institutions. Alternatively, if greater financial deepening leads to a lower saving rate or a lower 
investment rate, that effect could be mitigated when financial markets are equipped with highly 
developed legal systems. A similar argument can be applied to the effect of financial openness on 
                                                 
17 Because we focus on medium term dynamics, the predictions of the Mundell-Fleming model are of limited 
relevance in this framework. For the same reason, we do not control for the type of the exchange rate regime; it is not 
directly relevant to the level of current account balances, but to the speed of current account adjustment. However, we 
will examine the effect of different exchange rate regimes in the robustness checks. For the short-term current account 




19   
 
3.2 Results from the Basic Model: Does Market Size Matter? 
We first examine whether the size of financial markets (namely the sum of bank lending 
and equity markets as a ratio to GDP) matters for current account balances. Since these results 
are sensitive to the inclusion of the African countries, we also report separate sets of results with 
and without the African countries included for the developing country sample. We also report 
separate results for an emerging market group that differs somewhat from the developing country 
sample.
20  
Table 1 reports the results for the current account regressions for different subgroups. 
First, in contrast to the findings in Chinn and Ito (2007a), the budget balance variable is not 
statistically significant at conventional levels for any of the samples. A one percentage point 
increase (above the world GDP-weighted average) in the budget balance would lead to a 0.24 
percentage point increase in the current account balance for industrialized countries (IDC) and a 
little smaller effect for developing country groups, though none of them are statistically 
significant (with its p-value being 15% for IDC and ranging from 12% to 17% for developing 
country groups).   
This result differs from the results obtained in Chinn and Ito (2007a) where a one 
percentage point increase in the budget balance would lead to a 0.15 percentage point increase in 
                                                 
18 Bailliu (2000) shows that capital inflows, a proxy to capital account openness, can foster economic growth only if 
the level of domestic financial development is above a certain threshold whereas Chinn and Ito (2006) find that 
financial openness leads to financial development especially when a country achieves a certain level of legal and 
institutional development. 
19 As Chinn and Ito (2006) have shown, financial development and financial openness can be highly correlated. 
However, inclusion of the interaction terms makes the model setting nonlinear and thereby collinearity between these 
variables less of an issue, thereby allowing us to identify independent effects of these variables. 
20 The definition of emerging market countries relies upon the International Financial Corporation’s (IFC) indices. 
The group of emerging market countries in this study refers to the countries which were included in either the IFC’s 
Global, Investible, or Frontier Index as of 1995.  
  13
the current account balance for industrialized countries (IDC) and a little higher results for 
developing country groups. The differing results are ascribable to the use of a different measure 
of financial development – private credit – and longer sample period.
21  
SIZE exhibits a negative coefficient only in the industrial countries while its interaction 
with LEGAL is significantly positive for ex-Africa LDC and EMG groups, and its interaction 
with KAOPEN is significantly positive for industrial countries and significantly negative for 
developing and emerging market countries. This finding indicates that, for industrial countries, 
an expansion of the size of financial markets tends to decrease the current account balance. This 
effect is mitigated if the country is more financially open. The coefficient on the interaction term 
involving financial development and financial openness implies that greater financial openness 
will increase an industrial country’s propensity to export capital. Given these estimated 
relationships, U.S. behavior appears even more anomalous.   
The dynamics between financial development, financial openness, and institutional 
development are different for developing countries. The estimated coefficients for both financial 
development and legal/institutional variables are significantly positive, while none of the SIZE 
coefficients are significant for financial development in any developing country grouping. 
LEGAL is marginally significant for LDC and ex-Africa LDC (its p-value being 12% and 13%, 
respectively) and significant for EMG. The level variable for financial openness is significantly 
negative for all developing country samples, suggesting that a financially closed country such as 
China is more likely to run current account surpluses (or smaller deficits). The significantly 
positive coefficient for the interaction between financial development and legal development 
indicates that a larger financial market enhances the effect of legal development. The 
significantly negative coefficient for the interaction between financial development and financial 
                                                 
21 Also the LEGAL variable was included as a time-invariant variable.  
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openness indicates that a larger financial market lessens the effect of financial openness. 
The interpretation of the regression coefficients is complicated by the inclusion of the 
interaction terms. Below, we will present some intuitive interpretations using some numerical 
examples. For now, the key stylized facts are that among developing countries, those with 
developed financial markets (in terms of their size), more advanced legal systems and institutions, 
and/or closed financial markets tend to run current account surpluses. With this generalization, it 
is unsurprising that China, with a large but closed financial market, equipped with a mediocre 
index of institutional development, is running a large current account surplus.
22  In this respect, 
China at first glance appears to fit the saving glut thesis. We return to this issue later. 
The significantly positive coefficient for the oil exporting country dummy in the LDC 
and EMG samples are consistent with the recent rise in current account surpluses (and the 
accumulation foreign exchange reserves). Figure 1 demonstrates that the current account 
balances of “Middle East and N. Africa” rise and fall with oil price movements.   
We also estimate the regressions for both the national saving and investment equations 
(results not reported). While the results of the current account regression for industrial countries 
and ex-Africa LDCs are more consistent with the national saving regression (in terms of the 
significance levels of the estimated coefficients of our interest and the goodness of fit of the 
model), those of less developed and emerging market country groups show greater consistency 
with the results from the investment regressions than from those of the national saving regression. 
In other words, financial development and its interactions with legal development and financial 
openness affect current account balances through national saving for the IDC and ex-Africa LDC 
groups, and through investment for the LDC and EMG groups. 
Given that the SIZE variable is the sum of PCGDP and SMKC, we also ran regressions 
                                                 
22 The estimation results for the EMG group are found to be robust to exclusion of China from the sample.  
  15
using each of the two variables in place of FD in equation (1) to identify which of the 
components of SIZE is driving the results for the regressions shown in Table 1 (results not 
reported).
23  In terms of the goodness of fit, it seems slightly more likely that the regressions with 
PCGDP have a better fit than those with SMKC. However, in terms of the statistical significance 
and economic magnitude of the estimated coefficients, we cannot determine which of the 
variables yield more consistent results with those in Table 1. At the very least, as far as the 
sample period in this study is concerned, banking sector and equity market development seem to 
be equally important. 
 
3.2 Results for Extended Models: Activity and Efficiency 
Clearly, SIZE is unlikely to convey the full complexity of financial development. To 
capture how active financial markets are, we use stock market turnover ratios (SMTO) as the 
measure.
24  Since an active market is not necessarily an efficient market, we also seek an 
efficiency measure. We are not able to obtain such a measure for equity markets, but rely upon a 
banking sector indicator, the net interest margin (NETINT). This variable is the banks’ net 
interest revenues as a share of their interest-bearing (total earning) assets.
25  We invert this series 
(INVNETINT), and use it as a measure of market competitiveness of financial markets. We 
re-estimate the equation (1) model using these two variables. Also, since one can expect that 
market efficiency might affect international investors in a manner dependent upon market 
                                                 
23 Both PCGDP and SMKC together cannot be included in the regressions because these two variables are highly 
correlated with each other and thereby yielding the issue of multicollinearity.  
24 In the previous section, we used SMTV as the measure of stock market activeness. However, this variable is so 
highly correlated with SIZE that including both variables would not yield meaningful results. Stock market turnover 
(SMTO) can be a misleading indicator of stock market activeness since it is normalized by the market size, not the size 
of the economy. However, since the estimation model already controls for the size of financial markets, SMTO can be 
a useful indicator of market activeness. 
25 Originally, a higher value of NETINT indicates more interest rate margin, i.e., less competitive market conditions. 
However, to make its interpretation easier, we inverted the variable such that a higher value of INVNETINT means less 
interest margin opportunities, and more competitive market conditions.  
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openness, we also include an interactive term between INVNETINT and KAOPEN.
26  
The results shown in Table 2 are promising.
27 Interestingly,  inclusion  of  SMTO, 
INVNETINT, and interaction terms, has resulted in many heretofore marginally significant 
variables becoming more statistically and economically significant. Now, the estimated 
coefficients for financial development in all samples are significant – negative for industrial 
countries and positive for developing country groups.
28  
For all developing country groups, SMTO’s coefficients turn out to be significantly 
positive. This result suggests that countries with active financial (more particularly equity) 
markets might become capital exporters, instead of importers, contrary to the saving glut thesis 
or Dooley et al’s “Bretton Woods II” hypothesis. When the national saving and investment 
regressions are examined (results not reported), the results indicate that the positive effect of 
stock market turnover is driven by its significantly positive entry to the national saving 
regression (with no corresponding effect in the investment regression). This result implies that 
more active financial markets can enhance national saving.   
In industrial countries, a reduction in the net interest margin contributes to a lower 
current account balance, although the interaction terms seem to cancel out the linear effect for 
financially open countries. This means that an industrial country with more competitive, but less 
open, financial markets tends to have more smaller current account balances. For developing 
countries, more competitive financial markets seem to contribute to higher net saving; the level 
term of INVNETINT is found to be significantly positive for the LDC and ex-African LDC 
                                                 
26 The results shown below are generally unchanged if we use OVERHEAD, banks’ overhead costs as a share of their 
total assets, instead of INVNETINT. 
27 To conserve space in Table 2, we report the results only for the variables of interest. Complete results are available 
from the authors upon request. 
28 The magnitude and statistical significance for the oil exporter dummy increases as well.  
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groups (and marginally so for EMG). This result is driven more by the results in the investment 
regression, where both the INVNETINT level and interaction variables turn out to have 
significantly negative coefficients for the LDC and ex-African LDC groups, and only the 
interaction term for the EMG group.
29  
Inclusion of SMTO, INVNETINT, and interaction terms increases the statistical 
significance and the magnitude of the variables of our main interest, especially for the LEGAL 
variable and its interaction with SIZE and KAOPEN. Given the obvious policy implications, we 
assess the sensitivity of these results more extensively in the next section.   
 
3.3 Robustness Checks 
Before discussing the policy implications of our regression results, we conduct a few 
robustness checks. These checks include accounting for endogeneity of financial development, 
alternative measures of financial development, accounting for the exchange rate regime, 
excluding periods of financial crises and aftermaths, and separating out oil exporters from our 
sample. We address each of these aspects in turn. 
With respect to the first issue, financial development itself could be endogenous with 
respect to a country’s political and social infrastructure. Although we have used non-overlapping, 
five-year window panels to mitigate the problem of reverse-causality, it may still be worthwhile 
to conduct some robustness checks. To examine this flow of causality, we conduct 2SLS analysis 
by instrumenting the SIZE variable with some variables that can be the determinants of financial 
development. Boyd, et al. (2001) show that inflation significantly negatively affect both the 
                                                 
29 The results found in this exercise are robust when the U.S. is removed from the IDC group and also when China is 
removed from the EMG group.  
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banking sector development and equity market activity. La Porta, et al. (1998) demonstrate that 
the national legal origin (whether English, French, German, or Scandinavian) strongly explains 
cross-country differences in financial development. Therefore, we conduct 2SLS using inflation 
rates and the dummies for the national legal origin as instruments.
30  
The instrumental variables regression analysis yielded qualitatively similar results to 
those obtained before. In general, the estimation results are slightly weaker for the industrial 
country group. For less developed country groups, the statistical significance rose for many of 
the variables of our interest, so did the magnitude in some cases. At least, for developing and 
emerging market countries, we can safely conclude that our results shown in Table 1 are not 
driven by endogeneity between the dependent variable and the financial development variable 
and its interactions. 
There remain other types of financial markets we have not yet examined, such as private 
and public bond markets, and insurance markets. In an effort to fill that void, we construct an 
index that incorporates information on other aspects of financial development; we then 
re-estimate the regressions using this index (SIZE2) in the stead of SIZE. SIZE2 is the first 
principle component of private credit creation (PCGDP), stock market capitalization (SMKC), 
stock market total value (SMTV), private bond market capitalization (PVBM), public bond 
market capitalization (PBBM), inverted net interest rate margin (INVNETINT), and life insurance 
premium as a ratio to GDP (LIFEINS). Figure 8 compares regions using this financial 
development index while normalizing the index of the U.S. as 100. The historical patterns of 
financial development are similar to those displayed in Figure 2. However, the underperformance 
of developing countries’ financial markets as well as the U.S. relative strength appear more 
                                                 
30 All instruments were included as five year averages of the deviations from world weighted averages. Also, the 
instruments found to be insignificant in the first stage regressions were dropped.  
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distinct, reflecting that developing countries lag behind in bond and life insurance markets.   
We repeat the exercise in Table 1, using the composite index in place of SIZE.
31 
Interestingly, the estimated coefficients in the current account regressions becomes more 
significant for developing country groups, but not so for the regressions involving IDC group. 
For the LDC groups, all the variables of our interest except for the interaction between KAOPEN 
and LEGAL become more than 5% significant.
32  We also conduct the 2SLS analysis by 
instrumenting in the same way as described above. Although the estimated coefficient for the 
composite index becomes insignificant, other coefficients behave similarly. The results are 
almost unaffected for the national saving and investment regressions. 
There is a concern that one of the variables we have relied upon, private credit creation 
as a ratio to GDP (PCGDP), might provide an inaccurate depiction of financial development. In 
some economies, a large portion of financial intermediary is provided by public financial 
institutions, and the credit provided by such state-owned financial institutions to the private 
sector is included in PCGDP. This issue can become a concern when one uses this variable to 
proxy financial development in China, a country where the state has played a central role in the 
financial system. In order to address this concern, we adjust our measure by following the 
procedure outlined by Bekaert et al. (2006). Specifically, we take the La Porta et al. (2002) 
estimates of the ratios of government ownership of banks, and interpolate data over our sample 
period.
33  PCGDP is then multiplied by (1 minus the ratio of government ownership of banks). 
                                                 
31 The sample size is substantially reduced as PVBM and PBBM are available only after 1990 for a much smaller 
number of countries (especially for developing countries). Hence, the LDC group becomes the same as the EMG 
group. 
32 The coefficient estimates in the national saving regression become more significant for the IDC, whereas those of 
the investment become slightly less significant. However, the results are qualitatively the same as what we have found 
for IDC and LDC groups.  
33 La Porta et al. (2002) provide the estimates of the ratios of government ownership of banks for 92 developed and 
developing countries for 1970 and 1995. Bekaert et al. (2006) use La Porta et al’s data and interpolate the ratios for 
their sample period. Obviously, this method is not perfect; efforts of privatization are often discrete (e.g., after 
experiencing a crisis) and also are not necessarily monotonic in movement.   
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Using this “adjusted” PCGDP, we reconstruct the SIZE variable (SIZE2A).  
The SIZE2A series are compared across different regions and with the U.S. in Figure 9. 
The effect of the adjustment for government ownership of banks is striking for developing 
countries. In the 2001-05 period, the size of financial markets for China, Latin America, and 
other countries is less than 20% of U.S. In fact, China’s size of financial markets is merely 
13.1% of the U.S., confirming that China still has a long road to financial development.   
Last, we re-estimate the regressions using the adjusted SIZE variable. Interestingly, the 
results (not reported) are little changed, especially for developing countries. In other words, the 
results we have in Table 1 are robust to the adjustment for government’s involvement in the 
financial sector. This result is somewhat surprising. 
We also assessed the importance of the exchange rate regime. In our model setting, there 
is no obvious reason why different exchange rate regimes should affect the level of current 
account balances, though they may affect the speed of current account adjustment. While we do 
find the estimated coefficient on the dummy for the crawling exchange rate regime to be 
significantly positive for emerging market countries, inclusion of two other exchange rate 
dummies has little quantitative or qualitative impact upon the results shown in Tables 1 and 2. 
Edwards (2002) argues that current account deficits are correlated with the probability 
of financial crises occurring, suggesting that current account dynamics surrounding crisis years 
might exhibit anomalous behavior. Taking the 1997-98 period as one characterized as crisis years, 
we reconstruct the 5-year panels to exclude this period, and re-estimate our model. The 
estimation results remain intact. Similarly, we find that excluding post-1995 data does not make 
a substantial impact on the results. 
We also consider whether oil exporters behave in a fundamentally different manner than 
non-oil exporters. While we included an “oil exporter” dummy variable in our basic regression  
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specification, if being an oil exporter means that the slope coefficients are substantially different 
than those obtaining for non-oil exporters, then a dummy variable is not sufficient to address the 
issue of heterogeneity. When we exclude oil exporters from either the LDC or EMG subsample, 
the results are virtually unchanged. 
 
4.  Policy Implications 
One question that immediately arises is whether one should be surprised at the current 
set of global imbalances, given the estimates reported above. Figure 10 displays both actual and 
predicted current account balances for the industrial country group (Panel A) and the emerging 
market group (Panel B). In Panel A, we can see that the U.S. is one of the countries that 
experienced a larger current account deficit than predicted by the model.
34  Panel B shows that 
many of emerging East Asian countries appear in the area above the 45 degree line; they 
experienced larger current account surpluses than predicted by the model.
35 
A second question that can be asked is what will happen to East Asian current account 
balances if financial development and liberalization accelerates. Thus far, we have found some 
evidence that financial development affects current account balances. Here, we need to interpret 
how the estimated coefficients on financial development variable (SIZE) would affect current 
account balances, national saving, and investment in interaction with other institutional variables 
(LEGAL and KAOPEN). Also, we examine the effect of financial opening conditional upon the 
levels of financial and legal/institutional development. 
                                                 
34 The 45 degree line refers to the points where both actual and predicted values are the same. Hence, in the area above 
the 45 degree line, actual values are higher than predicted ones, meaning that countries’ current account balances are 
underpredicted by the model.  
35 The prediction errors shown in Figure 10 are consistent with either model misspecification or current account 
behavior being delinked from the fundamentals (and hence being unsustainable). Determination of which 
interpretation is more appropriate is outside the scope of this paper. Refer to Clarida (2007) for a debate regarding the 
issue of current account sustainability.  
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Panels A, B, and C in Figure 11 shows the total effect on current account, national 
saving, and investment (in terms of percentage points as a ratio to GDP), respectively, if the size 
of financial markets (SIZE) rises by 10% point above the world weighted average conditional on 
the levels of LEGAL and KAOPEN for emerging market countries.
36,37  The calculation is made 
based on the regression results shown in Column 4 of Table 2, and depending on whether the 
levels of LEGAL and KAOPEN are in the low decile, mean, or high decile in each subsample. 
This exercise illustrates how the impact of financial development can vary with the level of these 
two variables. For example, Panel A shows that a 10% point increase in SIZE (expressed as the 
deviation from the world weighted average) can lead an emerging market country equipped with 
both legal development and financial openness levels above the low 10 percentile (i.e., the bar at 
the northwest corner on the floor) to lower its current account as a ratio to GDP by a 0.186 
percentage point. Examining the bars at the same location in the other two panels allows us to 
determine whether the effect of such as a change comes from national saving or investment, or 
both.  
Theoretically, the total effects of financial development shown in the panels on national 
saving and investment should add up exactly to that on current account balances. However, as 
can be seen in the figures, this is not the case. At least, two reasons can be identified for this 
outcome. First, while the current account regressions account for the covariance of national 
savings and investment, simply adding two coefficients does not.
38  Second, due to differing data 
                                                 
36 Between the 1996-2000 and 2001-05 time periods, the (five-year average of relative) SIZE level – the level of 
financial deepening above or below the weighted world average – increased by 16.3 percentage points for Asian 
emerging market countries, and an astounding 39 percentage points for China. Therefore, examining the effect of a 
10% percentage point is not too unrealistic. 
37 This calculation holds other variables constant, including the level of stock market activeness (SMTO) and market 
efficiency (INVNETINT). 
38 If some change in one variable affects national saving and investment independently, as long as the change in 
national saving and investment does not affect each other, the net effect of the change ( I NS Δ − Δ ) would be the same 
as that on current account balances. However, if national saving and investment are highly correlated, as has been  
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conventions (Balance of Payments accounting versus national income accounting definition), the 
flows may not add up exactly. However, it is still worthwhile to examine the total effect on all 
three variables. 
For emerging market countries, we can generalize the total effect of financial 
development on current account balances as that the more financially open and the less 
legally/institutionally developed an emerging market country is, the more negative the total 
effect of financial development on the current account balance is to be. The result seems to be 
driven by the effects on both national saving and investment. Those countries that experience 
current account deterioration experience both deterioration in national saving and improvement 
in investment (except for those with mean KAOPEN and mean LEGAL). 
Panel D of Figure 11 categorizes emerging market countries in East Asia depending on 
the level of legal development and financial openness. The matrix shows that only Hong Kong 
and Singapore are categorized as countries with highest 10 percentile legal development and 
highest 10 percentile financial openness, while many Asian emerging market countries, including 
China, are categorized in the groups with the middle or lower level of legal development and 
financial openness. For these economies, financial development might lead to deterioration of 
current account balances if the economy is more open than the bottom decile and its legal 
systems are not in the top decile.   
What about financial opening? We have seen that China in particular has kept its 
financial markets closed, sparking considerable debate over what would occur in the event of 
capital account liberalization. Figure 12 presents a parallel analysis to what we did in Figure 11, 
but this time, we examine the total effect of financial opening, a one unit increase in KAOPEN, 
                                                                                                                                                             
found in many studies such as Feldstein and Horioka (1980) and Frankel et al. (1987), simply adding two coefficients 
does not yield the coefficient in the current account regression.  
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conditional upon the level of legal/institutional development and the size of financial markets. 
Panels A, B, and C report the total effect of financial opening on current account balances, 
national saving, and investment, respectively, for emerging market countries, and Panel D ranks 
East Asian emerging market countries by the level of financial openness measured by KAOPEN. 
Panel A of Figure 12 indicates that financial opening, holding the levels of both legal 
and financial development constant, would result in a typical emerging market economy 
experiencing a deteriorating current account balances, except when the economy is financially 
underdeveloped. Panels B and C show that the deterioration can be driven by either a large 
decrease in national saving combined with a smaller decrease in investment or a relatively 
smaller decrease in national saving combined with an improvement in investment. Either 
outcome is consistent with the saving glut hypothesis, although our results lead to a more 
nuanced view of the sources of the current account shift.     
A one unit increase in KAOPEN is equivalent to China increasing its level of financial 
openness to that of Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand. If one uses the observed Chinese values of 
SIZE, LEGAL, and KAOPEN, the implied impact on China’s current account balance would be a 
one percentage point decline. Considering that the size of current account surplus for the 
2001-05 period is 3.5%, this is not a non-trivial effect, although it must be kept in mind that the 
posited change in openness is very large.   
One caveat involves the proper measure of financial development in China, a 
particularly salient issue. If one measures financial market size adjusting for government bank 
ownership, the effect would be considerably smaller, about 0.35 percentage points. Thus, we 
believe the question of how much the Chinese current account balance would be affected by 
capital account opening remains an open one. 
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4.3 A Magnification Effect of Bond Markets?   
Our discussion thus far has focused on the Western side of the Pacific Ocean, with little 
reference to the U.S. The observation that the U.S. attracts capital from the rest of the world 
because of its deep and sophisticated financial markets has become something of a cliche. One 
separate, but related, line of argument is that for such an economy, financial development can 
function as a magnifier for the effect of other saving-investment determinants, especially budget 
balances. The idea is that a country with highly developed financial markets may find its budget 
constraint relaxed because its highly developed financial markets make it easier for the 
government to finance its budget. Chinn and Ito (2007a) were unable to find any evidence for 
this conjecture. Here, we take the opportunity to re-examine the magnifier effect with reference 
to the link between the budget and current account balances.   
Table 5 reports the regression results that incorporate the effect of public bond market 
development (measured by PBBM, public bond market capitalization as a ratio to GDP) and its 
interactive, i.e., magnifier, effect with budget balances. Columns (1) and (2) show the results for 
industrialized and emerging market countries, respectively, when the PBBM variable and its 
interaction with the budget balance variable are added to our basic model.
39 Since  the  PBBM 
data are limited, there is only an EMG group among the developing country groups. Columns (3) 
and (4) include stock market turnover, net interest margin, and its interaction with KAOPEN. 
Interestingly, for the industrial country group, whether in Column (1) or (3), the interaction term 
enters significantly. For emerging market countries, the level term for PBBM is significantly 
negative, but the interaction term is insignificant. The significant coefficient on PBBM for 
emerging market countries may reflect the tendency that emerging market countries attempt to 
                                                 
39 We also include a dummy for Japan since, as Figure 5 shows, Japan, a country with not only a big public bond 
market, but also big current account surpluses, can be driving the results as an outlier. In fact, the estimated coefficient 
for the dummy is found to be significantly positive.  
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borrow abroad to finance their budgetary programs. Using the actual 5-year average of the U.S. 
budget balance and the estimates from Columns (1) and (3), the estimated coefficient of is found 
to be as high as 0.487 and 0.642, respectively. These figures are around the high end of the value 
range of 0.10-0.49 found in Chinn and Ito (2007a).   
As was shown in Figure 5, Japan and oil exporting countries in the Middle East, both of 
which are big current account surplus countries, could be driving the results as outliers. Also, the 
magnifier effect of financial development can be more important for those countries that try to 
finance themselves from foreign capital. Therefore, we re-estimated by restricting our sample to 
only country-years when the net foreign assets (that are included only from the first year of each 
five-year panel) are negative. The results are shown in Columns (5) and (6) for industrial and 
emerging market countries, respectively. Now in these specifications, the significance of the 
estimated coefficient on the interaction term disappears for the IDC group, though the significant 
coefficient for the PBBM variable remains for the EMG group. However, interestingly, the 
estimated coefficient on budget balances for industrial countries remain significant and its 
magnitude is still high, 0.48. (the p-value for the interaction term is now 22%). At the very least, 
budget balances seem to play an important role for current account balances for industrial 
countries. 
 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we have taken a closer look at the effect of financial development on the 
present configuration of global imbalances. In particular, we scrutinized the effect of financial 
development from various perspectives: different types of financial markets such as equity, bond, 
and insurance markets as well as different aspects of financial development such as the cost 
performance, size, and activeness of the industry. We also examined the role of nonlinearities, in  
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terms of interactions with financial openness and institutional development.   
The empirical results from our basic model suggest that the size of financial markets 
does matter for saving and investment determination. Among developing countries, those with 
developed financial markets (in terms of their size), better legal systems and institutions, and/or 
closed financial markets tend to run current account surpluses. We also found that banking sector 
and equity market development seem to be equally important. 
We also extended our basic model by including variables that control for the degree of 
activity of financial markets, as well as for market competitiveness. Based upon the results from 
this extended model, we determined that that an industrial country with more competitive, but 
less open, financial markets tends to run larger current account surpluses. For developing 
countries, more competitive financial markets result in a tendency to run larger current account 
surpluses, a finding in contradiction to the saving glut thesis. Also, developing countries with 
active equity markets tend to become capital exporters, largely because more active equity 
markets induce greater national savings. This result is again in contradiction to the saving glut 
hypothesis. 
Generally, we found that for emerging market countries, financial development may 
lead to deterioration of current account balances if the economy exhibits greater than the average 
openness and a legal system not in the top decile. In other cases, this linkage is not apparent. 
Moreover, greater financial opening tends to make an emerging market economy run a smaller 
current account surplus, especially if the economy is financially underdeveloped. 
We also investigated whether financial development – rather than shifting the saving and 
investment schedules –magnifies the impact of other determinants of saving and investment 
behavior. More specifically, we examined whether public bond markets contribute to relaxing 
budget constraints and jointly to affecting current account balances. We find some limited  
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evidence in favor of such a magnification effect. One interesting finding is that inclusion of a 
bond market variable results in an estimated impact of the budget balance on the current account 
balance that is substantially higher than that obtained in many other studies, including our 
previous study (Chinn and Ito, 2007a). 
Overall, our investigation revealed numerous results relevant to the debate over the 
sources of global imbalances. At the minimum, we have demonstrated that these two hypotheses 
might have not be exclusionary. First, as we have shown in our previous study, budget balances 
should not be ruled out as a determinant of current account balances. A one-percentage point 
improvement in the budget balance can lead to about half a percentage point improvement in 
current account balances for industrialized countries. Second, when we focus on the 
competitiveness of banking markets or the activeness of capital markets as a measure of financial 
development, we find the evidence against the saving glut hypothesis. That is, more competitive 
banking markets or more active equity markets do not necessarily lead countries to become 
greater capital importers. Third, in terms of the size, financial development does matter for 
current account balances, but the effect is conditional upon other institutional factors such as 
capital account openness and legal or institutional development. Fourth, financial openness leads 
to current account deterioration in a manner consistent with some aspects of the saving glut 
hypothesis predicts. That is, countries with more developed legal systems and more developed 





The data used in this paper were drawn from a number of different sources. We provide below a listing of 
the mnemonics for the variables used in the analysis, descriptions of these variables and the source(s) 
from which the primary data for constructing these variables were taken. A listing of the countries in the 
final sample, along with the country groupings used in the analysis, is provided in the working paper 
version of this paper. For most countries, data were available from 1971 through 2004.   
 
Mnemonic Source*  Variable  description 
CURRENT  WDI, IFS, WEO   Current account to GDP ratio 
NATL_SAVING  WDI        National saving to GDP ratio 
GROSS_KF  WDI        Capital formation to GDP ratio 
GSUR  WDI, IFS    General government budget balance, ratio to GDP 
NFA  LM      Stock of net foreign assets, ratio to GDP 
RELY  WDI  Relative per capita income, adjusted by PPP exchange 
rates, Measured relative to the U.S., range (0 to 1) 
RELDEPY WDI  Youth  dependency  ratio, Population under 15 / Population 
between 15 and 65 
RELDEPO  WDI      Old dependency ratio, Population 
    over 65 / Population between 15 and 65 
YGRAVG  WDI      Average real GDP growth 
TOTSD  WDI      Standard deviation of terms of trade 
OPEN  WDI  Openness indicator: ratio of exports plus imports of goods 
and nonfactor services to GDP 
SIZE  BDL,  Authors’  calc.  Financial Market Development in terms of its size, 
PCGDP + SMKC 
PCGDP  BDL      Private credit creation as a ratio to GDP 
SMTV  BDL  Stock market total value as a ratio to GDP, as a measure of 
financial market activeness   
SMTO BDL      Stock  market  turnover 
PVBM  BDL      Private bond market capitalization as a ratio to GDP 
PBBM  BDL      Public bond market capitalization as a ratio to GDP 
LIFEINS  BDL      Life insurance premium as a ratio to GDP 
OVERHEAD  BDL   Accounting value of a bank’s overhead costs as a share of 
its total assets 
(INV)NETINT  BDL  Accounting value of bank’s net interest revenue as a share 
of its interest-bearing (total earning) assets. 
SIZE2  BDL,  Authors’  calc.  General level of financial development, first principal 
component of PCGDP,  SMKC,  SMTV,  PVBM,  PBBM, 
INVNETINT, and LIFEINS 
SIZE2A BDL,  Authors’  calc.  SIZE adjusted for the size of public sector involvement 
KAOPEN  Chinn-Ito    Capital account openness 
BQ ICRG      Quality  of  Bureaucracy 
LAO  ICRG      Law and order 
CORRUPT ICRG        Corruption  index 
LEGAL Authors’  calculations  General  level  of legal development, first principal 
component of BQ, LAO, and CORRUPT.   
  
* These are mnemonics for the sources used to construct the corresponding. BDL: Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt,  
  30
and Levine (2001, updated in following years); CI: Chinn and Ito (2006); ICRG: International Country 
Risk Guide; IFS: IMF’s International Financial Statistics; IMF: Other IMF databases; LM: Lane and 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Government budget balance  0.236  0.151  0.211  0.146 
  [0.162]
15%  [0.112]  [0.134]  [0.117] 
Net foreign assets (initial)  0.058  0.042  0.037  0.043 
  [0.017]*** [0.007]*** [0.012]***  [0.008]***
Relative income  0.101  -0.122  -0.028  -0.126 
  [0.038]*** [0.097]  [0.098]  [0.113] 
Relative income squared  -0.452  -0.123  0.012  -0.139 
  [0.195]**  [0.114]  [0.118]  [0.128] 
Dependency ratio (young)  0.028  -0.012  -0.02  0.011 
  [0.038]  [0.020]  [0.021]  [0.023] 
Dependency ratio (old)  0.07  -0.016  -0.023  -0.011 
  [0.034]**  [0.017]  [0.017]  [0.023] 
Financial Develop. (SIZE)  -0.032  0.015  0.015  0.014 
  [0.015]**  [0.010]  [0.012]  [0.009] 
Legal development (LEGAL)  0.023  0.017  0.02  0.021 
  [0.012]**  [0.009]*  [0.011]*  [0.010]** 
SIZE x LEGAL  0.014  0.015  0.013  0.019 
  [0.012]  [0.006]**  [0.008]
11%  [0.007]***
Financial open. (KAOPEN)  0.016  -0.013  -0.014  -0.014 
  [0.012]  [0.006]**  [0.008]*  [0.007]** 
KAOPEN x LEGAL  0.01  0.001  0.001  0 
  [0.008]  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.002] 
KAOPEN x SIZE  0.03  -0.006  -0.009  -0.008 
  [0.014]**  [0.003]*  [0.004]**  [0.003]** 
TOT volatility  0.107  0.012  0.017  0.02 
  [0.071]  [0.025]  [0.024]  [0.028] 
Avg. GDP growth  0.146  -0.04  -0.229  0.069 
  [0.311]  [0.151]  [0.145]  [0.163] 
Trade openness  0.024  0.032  0.021  0.037 
  [0.016]  [0.011]*** [0.013]*  [0.013]***
Oil exporting countries  –  0.041  0.027  0.043 
  –  [0.013]*** [0.018]  [0.013]***
Observations  81  156  125  125 
Adjusted R-squared    0.52  0.55  0.52  0.59 
All the variables to be included in the estimation, except for net foreign assets to GDP, are 
converted into the deviations from the GDP-weighted world mean before being calculated 
into the five year averages. Robust standard errors in brackets, * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The estimated coefficients for the time-fixed 
dummies and constant are not shown.  
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Government budget balance  0.187  0.228  0.231  0.237 
  [0.191]  [0.113]**  [0.152]  [0.126]* 
Financial Develop. (SIZE)  -0.03  0.019  0.02  0.02 
  [0.013]**  [0.009]**  [0.011]*  [0.009]** 
Stock Market Activeness (SMTO)  0.015  0.009  0.007  0.009 
  [0.012]  [0.004]**  [0.004]*  [0.005]* 
Net Interest Margin (INVNETINT)  -0.901  0.374  0.376  0.246 
  [0.505]*  [0.152]**  [0.197]*  [0.152]
11% 
INVNETINT x KAOPEN  0.809  0.042  0.081  0.018 
  [0.367]**  [0.066]  [0.076]  [0.062] 
Legal/Inst. development (LEGAL)  0.025  0.031  0.032  0.032 
  [0.011]**  [0.009]*** [0.012]***  [0.009]***
SIZE x LEGAL  0.01  0.024  0.022  0.027 
  [0.012]  [0.006]*** [0.008]***  [0.006]***
Financial openness (KAOPEN)  0.019  -0.016  -0.017  -0.019 
  [0.010]*  [0.006]*** [0.008]**  [0.007]***
KAOPEN x LEGAL  0.002  0  0.002  0 
  [0.008]  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.002] 
KAOPEN x SIZE  0.029  -0.009  -0.012  -0.011 
  [0.013]**  [0.003]*** [0.004]***  [0.003]***
Oil exporting countries  –  0.054  0.05  0.048 
  –  [0.015]*** [0.020]**  [0.016]***
Observations  77  140  114  112 
Adjusted R-squared  0.56  0.63  0.58  0.65 
All the variables to be included in the estimation, except for net foreign assets to GDP, are converted into 
the deviations from the GDP-weighted world mean before being calculated into the five year averages. 
Robust standard errors in brackets, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The 
estimated coefficients for relative income, its quadratic term, young dependency ratio, old dependency 





Table 3: The Impact of Public Bond Market Development 






















  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Government budget balance  0.503 0.105  0.619 0.199  0.481 0.076 
  [0.153]*** [0.300]  [0.176]*** [0.309]  [0.241]* [0.366] 
Budget balance x PBBM  -0.767 -0.216  -1.11 0.628  -0.741 0.952 
  [0.394]* [1.116]  [0.278]*** [1.375]  [0.590] [1.664] 
Public Bond Mkt. Dev. (PBBM)  0.005 -0.054  -0.004 -0.135  0.016 -0.144 
  [0.017] [0.038]  [0.015] [0.036]***  [0.019] [0.038]***
Financial Develop. (SIZE)  -0.022 0.013  -0.027 0.02  -0.034 0.038 
  [0.011]* [0.014]  [0.012]** [0.012]  [0.015]** [0.016]**
Stock Market Activeness (SMTO)     0.022  0.016  0.027 0.015 
     [0.009]** [0.006]***  [0.012]** [0.006]**
Net Interest Margin (INVNETINT)     -0.332  0.686  -0.309 0.616 
     [0.445]  [0.238]***  [0.460] [0.306]* 
NETINT x KAOPEN     -0.395  0.226  -0.327 0.208 
     [0.493]  [0.083]***  [0.518] [0.108]* 
Legal/Inst. development (LEGAL)  0.02 0.019  0.016 0.032  0.026 0.027 
  [0.010]** [0.013]  [0.011] [0.010]***  [0.015]* [0.013]**
SIZE x LEGAL  0.024 0.016  0.031 0.028  0.034 0.025 
  [0.012]* [0.009]*  [0.012]** [0.007]***  [0.014]** [0.010]**
Financial openness (KAOPEN)  -0.008 -0.024  -0.011 -0.026  -0.015 -0.022 
  [0.009] [0.010]** [0.009] [0.009]***  [0.011] [0.010]**
KAOPEN x LEGAL  0.022 -0.002  0.022 -0.001  0.022 -0.002 
  [0.006]*** [0.003]  [0.009]** [0.003]  [0.010]** [0.003] 
KAOPEN x SIZE  0.005 -0.009  0.001 -0.017  -0.003 -0.012 
  [0.011] [0.004]** [0.010] [0.003]***  [0.011] [0.006]**
Observations  80 72  76 65  55 58 
Adjusted R-squared  0.65 0.60  0.71 0.77  0.63 0.49 
All the variables to be included in the estimation, except for net foreign assets to GDP, are converted into the 
deviations from the GDP-weighted world mean before being calculated into the five year averages. Robust standard 
errors in brackets, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The estimated coefficients for 
relative income, its quadratic term, young dependency ratio, old dependency ratio, TOT volatility, output growth, 
trade openness, the time-fixed dummies and constant are not shown. There is no oil exporting countries in any of the 
subsamples.  
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Figure 1: Current Account Balances by Region 
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Figure 2: Financial Market Development (Size)   
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Figure 3: Financial Market Development (Activeness) 
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Figure 4: Private Bond Market Development   
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Figure 5: Public Bond Market Development 
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Figure 8: Comparison by “Financial Development Index” 
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Figure 9: “Adjusted” Financial Market Size 
Adjusted Fin. Market Development (SIZE2A), US=100
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Figure 10: Actual Current Account Balances and In-Sample Predictions 
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Figure 11: Total Effect of Financial Development for Emerging Market Countries
A: On Current Account Balances 
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D: Matrix for Emerging Asia 
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NOTE: The mean and 10 and 90 percentiles of LEGAL and KAOPEN used 
for calculation are based on the data of the 1996-2000 and 2001-05 periods.43 
Figure 12: Total Effect of Financial Liberalization for Emerging Market Countries
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D: Ranking of Financial Openness for Emerging Asia 
Country  KAOPEN [0, 4.37]








NOTE: The mean and 10 and 90 percentiles of LEGAL and SIZE used 
for calculation are based on the data of the 1996-2000 and 2001-05 
periods. KAOPEN ranges [0, 4.37]. For the construction of KAOPEN, 
refer to the text and Chinn and Ito (2007). 
 